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IntroductIon
The crisis in Russia’s financial market, which started in mid-December 2014, 
has exposed the real scale of the economic problems that have been growing in 
Russia for several years. Over the course of the last year, Russia’s basic macro-
economic indicators deteriorated considerably, the confidence of its citizens in 
the state and in institutions in charge of economic stability declined, the gov-
ernment and business elites became increasingly dissatisfied with the policy 
direction adopted by the Kremlin, and fighting started over the shrinking re-
sources. 
According to forecasts obtained from both governmental and expert commu-
nities, Russia will fall into recession in 2015. The present situation is the result 
of the simultaneous occurrence of three unfavourable trends: the fact that the 
Russian economy’s resource-based development model has reached the limits 
of its potential due to structural weaknesses, the dramatic decline in oil prices 
in the second half of 2014, and the impact of Western economic sanctions. 
Given the inefficiency of existing systemic mechanisms, in the coming years 
the Russian leadership will likely resort to ad hoc solutions such as switching 
to a more interventionist “manual override” mode in governing the state. In 
the short term, this will allow them to neutralise the most urgent problems, 
although an effective development policy will be impossible without a funda-
mental change of the political and economic system in Russia.
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I. How tHe crIsIs broke out last December
The “Black Tuesday” of 16 December 2014 on the Moscow stock exchange ex-
posed the fragility of the Russian financial system. The dollar and euro ex-
change rates unexpectedly soared to record levels of 80 and 100 roubles per 
unit of currency, respectively. The collapse of the rouble was a culmination 
of its gradual depreciation in the preceding months,1 caused in large part by 
declining oil prices and the tensions between Russia and the West over Mos-
cow’s aggressive policy towards Ukraine. However, the Russian currency was 
also hit by a series of developments which destabilised the country’s financial 
market. The most important ones concerned a peak in demand for currency as 
the deadline approached for the repayment of a large instalment of the corpo-
rate sector’s foreign-held debt, and a crisis in market players’ confidence in the 
policy of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR). The latter occurred because of the 
Bank’s inefficacy in fighting inflation and defending the rouble exchange rate 
(the base rate was raised twice in December, increasing from 9.5% to 17%,2 and 
even though the Bank spent more than US$ 8 billion on currency interventions 
in the first half of the month, that failed to prevent the rouble from depreciat-
ing further) and this was also a reaction to the rumours of Rosneft’s currency 
speculations, which had been made possible by a loan of RUB 625 billion grant-
ed to the company by state-owned banks. 
The pessimistic forecast predicting a serious recession in 2015, published by 
the CBR on 15 December, did not help ease the situation either. It is notable that 
the rouble crashed while oil prices were declining softly even if steadily (US$60 
per barrel at that time). Sergey Shvetsov, the first deputy governor of the CBR, 
described the situation as unforseen and “critical”. Some symptoms of a bank 
run were observed as customers started withdrawing rouble-denominated de-
posits (albeit not on a massive scale) and some bank branches, fearing a loss of 
liquidity, imposed withdrawal limits. 
In the days that followed, the situation in the financial market calmed own 
and the currency exchange rates became stable at the pre-crash levels, despite 
1 At the beginning of the year one dollar cost around 33 roubles while one euro – around 
45 roubles. On 1 December the currencies cost around 49 roubles and 61 roubles respective-
ly, and on 15 December – around 63 and 78 roubles, respectively.
2 The base rate was 5.5% at the beginning of the year. The most recent increase of 15 Decem-
ber, when the base rate was increased by 6.5 percentage points to 17%, not only failed to calm 
down the financial market but on the contrary, worsened the crisis by provoking a loss of 
confidence in the Russian currency.
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experiencing normal fluctuations.3 This was due mainly to the announcement 
of the government’s anti-crisis action plan. The appreciation of the rouble 
could also have been related to the fact that the corporate sector faced a tax 
payment deadline (more than RUB 200 billion was due on 25 December), which 
increased the demand for the domestic currency. Moreover, customers gained 
greater trust in rouble deposits after the interest rates had been increased con-
siderably (even above 20%).4 
3 That is, at a level comparable to the exchange rate of 11–12 December when one dollar cost 
around 57 roubles and one euro – around 70 roubles. On 17 December the dollar and euro ex-
change rates started falling systematically to reach 52–54 roubles and 64–66 roubles, re-
spectively, on 23–25 December, and in the last days of December and first days of January, 
the two currencies appreciated again 60 roubles for one dollar and more than 70 roubles for 
one euro. In late January the value of the currencies decreased again.
4 Efforts to prevent a bank run through high interest rates on deposits (much above the base 
rate) generate other problems with ensuring the financial liquidity of banks and necessi-
tate recourse to financial assistance from the state.
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II. tHe government’s antI-crIsIs tactIc
The breakdown of the Russian financial market forced the government to im-
mediately come up with a programme of anti-crisis action aimed mainly at safe-
guarding the stability of the banking system, whose sound condition is a prereq-
uisite of the stability and reliability of Russia’s entire economic system. 
On 17 December the CBR announced a seven-point plan which provided for in-
creasing the volume of currency credit available to banks in order to improve 
their foreign currency liquidity, easing the restrictions on banks with regard 
to the setting of interest rates on loans and deposits, and easing the require-
ments concerning mandatory reserves.5 The state Duma then endorsed the 
government’s proposals for legislative amendments that would authorise the 
provision of RUB 1 billion in extra capital to the banks alongside a doubling of 
the volume of guarantees for deposits of citizens (from RUB 700 billion to RUB 
1.4 trillion). The Russian finance minister also announced that the limit up to 
which the Reserve Fund may be drawn upon could be increased several-fold, 
even to as much as 70% of the Fund’s value (the current limit is RUB 500 billion; 
the Fund was worth RUB 4.95 trillion as of 1 January 2015).
Informal measures have also been undertaken: the government started pres-
suring big business to start selling some of the foreign currency it was earning. 
Such unconventional measures included, for instance, Vladimir Putin’s per-
sonal “persuasive” phone calls to certain oligarchs (of which he informed the 
public during a press conference on 18 December), as well as the fact that the 
subject was raised during the president’s meeting with representatives of big 
business on 19 December. The government was successful in encouraging large 
companies to keep selling currency in accordance with a government-defined 
schedule at least until the end of the year, and decided to monitor the currency 
operations of the largest exporters.6 At the same time the government decided 
that – at least for the time being – it would not impose capital restrictions that 
could ultimately ruin Russia’s reputation in the eyes of the investors. 
5 О мерах Банка России по поддержанию устойчивости российского финансового сектора, 
http://www.cbr.ru/press/pr.aspx?file=17122014_171432dkp2014-12-17T17_02_49.htm, 
17.12.2014.
6 On 23 December 2014 the Russian government also adopted special directives that imposed 
ceilings on the amount of foreign currency assets that certain large state-owned companies 
are allowed to keep, http://government.ru/news/16277/, 23.12.2014.
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
9
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
2/
20
15
As the Russian minister for economic development Alexei Ulyukayev admit-
ted, the anti-crisis measures were largely reactive7 and served to neutralise 
the biggest threats to the economic system as they emerged, but they did not 
add up to a coherent strategy to overcome the crisis.8 That is because the causes 
of the crisis run much deeper than a temporary breakdown of the financial 
market and are in part beyond the Russian government’s control. 
7 Инфляция достигнет высших показателей в I квартале 2015 года — Улюкаев, http://www.
vedomosti.ru/politics/news/37880501/inflyaciya-dostignet-vysshih-pokazatelej-v-i-kvar-
tale-2015, 26.12.2014.
8 Notable in this context was the statement by Vladimir Putin who ordered the government 
on 18 December to go for “manual override” in “crisis management” while carefully control-
ling the situation in individual sector of the economy and undertaking ad hoc “rescue” 
measures. 
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III. causes of tHe crIsIs
The current economic crisis in Russia has three main causes: 
(1) the worsening structural problems of the Russian economy, 
(2) serious tensions in the relations between Russia and the West, which have 
led to the “sanctions war”,
(3) the dramatic slump in oil prices in the second half of 2014. 
None of those phenomena would have caused such a rapid decline of the coun-
try’s economic situation on their own, but their simultaneous occurrence has 
left the Russian government facing very serious challenges. 
The dysfunction of the Russian economic system stems from the fact that the 
current resource-based economic model has reached the limits of its po-
tential. The Russian economy depends on the extraction and export of energy 
resources (which account for around 70% of export revenues, 50% of budget 
revenues and 20% of GDP) and is therefore highly susceptible to fluctuations 
in the global commodity markets. The easy money from the oil rents has for 
years undermined any motivation the government could have to support more 
innovative, high-technology branches of industry, which are lagging behind 
in Russia as a result. Thus, it will not be possible for Russia to quickly develop 
other industry sectors that could generate stable export and budget revenue. 
The internal sources of economic growth in Russia have also become exhausted 
in recent years as the production capacity of the current, unreformed system 
of “state capitalism” reached its limits (the state, along with state-controlled 
corporations, accounts for around 70% of the Russian economy). A quantum 
leap will not be possible without extensive reforms, which the Russian leader-
ship is not prepared to undertake. 
Some of the key problems concern insufficient investment and slow progress 
in the modernisation of production through new technologies and new man-
agement techniques. The main factors that have been impeding investment 
and modernisation include, first and foremost, the inefficient and corrupt state 
administration system, as well as Russia’s institutional and legal environment, 
which is unfriendly to investors and makes the costs of doing business dispro-
portionately high.9 
9 According to the minister for economic development Alexei Ulyukayev, transaction costs 
currently account for 35% of the total cost of doing business, and according to the minister 
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As the political elites have coalesced with big business in Russia, embezzle-
ment of public money is rampant. The essence of Russia’s economic problems 
can be seen in the debates, often fiery, among representatives of the govern-
ment and the business circles about the course adopted by the Kremlin. In this 
context, the critiques of Russia’s economic policy voiced by the economic devel-
opment minister, Alexei Ulyukayev, and the CEO of the state-owned Sberbank, 
German Gref, were particularly symptomatic.10
The negative trends in the Russian economy began in 2012 when Russia re-
ported slower GDP growth for the first time since the 2008–2009 crisis (3.4% 
compared to 4.3% in 2011). This trend deepened over the following year when 
Russia’s economy grew by a mere 1.3%. Even though oil prices in international 
markets were still high during the period in question (over US$ 100 per bar-
rel11), Russia reported one of the lowest growth rates among the emerging econ-
omies. This negative trend continued in 2014: between the 1st and 3rd quarter, 
GDP growth declined down slowly but systematically, decreasing from 0.9% to 
0.7%. Adjusted for seasonal factors, this figure means that Russia’s economic 
growth was close to zero. 
Declining investment is another worrying trend, because investments account 
for 20% of Russia’s GDP. Between January and September 2014, fixed capital 
investment decreased by 2.5% compared to the same period in 2013, and the de-
cline continued in the months that followed (in November, fixed capital invest-
ment decreased by 4.8% year-on-year). Meanwhile, a downward trend in pri-
vate investment persisted in Russia, which was not offset by increased public 
investment.12 Even though industrial production was growing slowly for most 
for open government, Mikhail Abyzov, ineffective administration reduces the GDP by 
2-5%. Этот шторм мы сами и готовили – interview with Alexei Ulyukayev in Vedomosti, 
18.12.2014; Начавшийся кризис может стать затяжным, http://www.vedomosti.ru/poli-
tics/news/37879891/cugcvang-ekonomiki, 26.12.2014.
10 Ulyukayev voiced his opinions most vocally in an interview for Vedomosti on 18 December 
2014. Gref harshly criticised the government policies (comparing Russia’s present situation 
to the final period of the USSR) at the “Russia calling!” investment forum in October 2014. 
His main points concerned overregulation of the legal sphere, weakness of state institu-
tions, excessive red tape and the state’s practices that suppress entrepreneurship (a more 
moderate critique was voiced during the Gaidar Forum in January 2015).
11 The average price in 2013 was nearly US$ 108 and in 2012 – more than US$ 110 per barrel. 
12 Инвестиции в основной капитал России сократились на 2,5%, http://vz.ru/news/2014/10/ 
17/ 711087.html, 17.10.2014; Статистика ноября предрекает России глубокую рецессию 
в 2015 году, http://ru.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idRUKBN0JV21O20141217?pageN
umber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp=true, 17.12.2014.
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of the year, this was mainly the result of public procurement, including in the 
defence sector, as well as the depreciation of the rouble and attempts at import 
substitution. Those impulses, however, reached their limits in the 4th quarter 
of 2014. 
The Russian people have also become less inclined to consume (leaving aside 
the temporary spending spree in December when people tried to get rid of the 
depreciating rouble), which has further slowed down the economy (household 
spending accounted for around 50% of the GDP in Russia in 2013 and thus rep-
resents a significant factor).
After the rouble lost nearly half of its value, the Central Bank of Russia decided 
that this posed a threat to the financial stability of the country. The deprecia-
tion was the main factor behind the significant increase of inflation from 6.5% 
in 2013 to 11.4%13 currently (the dynamics of price increases visibly accelerated 
after the December “depreciation shock”). Inflation in Russia reached two-digit 
levels for the first time in six years. 
As a result of the CBR’s repeated currency interventions in the market in order 
to combat inflation, Russia’s currency reserves shrank by more than US$ 120 
billion. The interventions failed to significantly improve the stability of the 
Russian currency but at the same time diminished the system’s financial se-
curity “cushion” (the reserves dropped below US$ 400 billion for the first time 
since 2009: between 3 January and 26 December 2014 they decreased from US$ 
510.5 billion to US$ 388.5 billion14). 
According to the CBR, more than US$ 150 billion of capital flew out of Russia 
in 2014. The only positive outcome of the depreciation was the budget surplus 
that Russia reported in 2014 as a result of growing export revenues, equivalent 
to 0.7% of GDP according to the Finance Ministry. However, at the same time, 
in view of Russia’s deteriorating economic situation, the main rating agencies 
cut its credit rating to levels only slightly above speculative grade or junk, with 
negative outlooks. On 26 January Standard & Poor’s cut Russia’s rating to junk. 
Moody’s downgraded Russia to Baa3-, i.e. the lowest investment-grade level, 
as did Fitch, with a rating of BBB. Bloomberg estimated that the likelihood of 
13 According to preliminary Rosstat figures as of end of December; http://www.interfax.ru/
business/416458, 31.12.2014.
14 Moreover, in just two weeks between 12 and 26 December the reserves decreased by US$ 
27 billion.
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an economic breakdown in Russia was higher than in many countries with 
speculative-grade ratings. Meanwhile, the yields on Russian treasury bonds 
were among the highest among the emerging economies (around 7% for bonds 
denominated in dollars with maturity dates in 2023).15
While the deficiencies of the Russian economic and political system did threat-
en to cause economic stagnation in the foreseeable future, most probably they 
would not have led to major upheaval, if not for the deep crisis in russia’s re-
lations with the west in the aftermath of russia’s annexation of crimea 
and its military actions in eastern ukraine. The crisis affected Russia’s 
economy by significantly undermining the country’s international image and 
engendering the “sanctions war”. 
The reaction of capital markets to Moscow’s aggressive moves against Ukraine 
exemplified the rapid and politically motivated loss of trust in Russia on the 
part of the international community: it meant higher capital outflows from 
Russia (more than US$ 50 billion in the first quarter of 2014, four times as much 
as had been expected), and considerable losses in the Moscow stock exchange 
on the “Black Monday” of 3 March 2014.16 
Russia’s investment and credit worthiness was further undermined by the 
Western economic sanctions imposed as of the end of July in response to Mos-
cow’s destabilisation of eastern Ukraine. Of the measures imposed, the finan-
cial sanctions have turned out to be the most significant in the short term. 
Many key Russian banks and companies faced restrictions on access to West-
ern sources of financing, in a situation in which they heavily depended on for-
eign capital (in 2013, European banks provided around 75% of external financ-
ing for the Russian banking sector and European investments accounted for 
80% of total investments in Russia17). In this context, one should be sceptical 
15 Трейдеры высоко оценили вероятность дефолта по гособлигациям России, http://top.rbc.
ru/economics/09/01/2015/54af79129a79474c3096e015, 9.01.2015.
16 The brief slump in the stock exchange was a reaction to the decision adopted by the Federa-
tion Council on 1 March 2014 to authorise the president to use Russian troops in the territo-
ry of Ukraine. In just one day, the RTS dollar index lost 12%, and the MMVB rouble index 
nearly 11%. 
17 Figures for the banking sector in the 4th quarter of 2013 quoted after: R.M. Nelson, U.S.-Rus-
sia Economic Relations, CRS Insights, 1.08.2014, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IN10119.pdf#_
Ref390161120; figures of the Ministry of Economic Development on investment: http://econ-
omy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/foreignEconomicActivity/cooperation/economi-
cEurope/.
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about Russia’s ability to raise capital in Asian markets because access to those 
markets is more difficult and the cost of capital for external players is higher. 
The consequences of sanctions became painful for Russia in December 2014: 
the fact that the country had to repay or refinance a large tranche of its debt 
(around US$ 35 billion), in a situation in which it was cut off from Western capi-
tal and the rouble had lost much of its value, was one of the reasons behind 
the slump in Russian financial markets in mid-December and also affected the 
corporate sector’s financial stability. The indirect effect of sanctions is more 
difficult to estimate, but the tendency of European and US actors to withdraw 
en masse from financial and investment co-operation with Russian companies, 
often “just in case”, may have some long-term consequences. 
Russia’s economic situation worsened further as a result of the retaliatory 
measures it applied in August, i.e. the embargo on the imports of many ag-
ricultural and food products from countries that had imposed the original 
sanctions. The resulting market shortages, combined with under-developed 
domestic production and the high cost of importing food from alternative 
sources, almost immediately drove up the prices of many categories of goods, 
in some cases by several dozen per cent. Average inflation in the food sector 
reached 15.4%, i.e. nearly twice as high as in 2013, and much higher than the 
price increases reported for industrial goods and services,18 despite the efforts 
made by the government to control prices, i.e. through the restrictions on the 
export of cereals imposed in December. 
The mounting structural problems that have been troubling the Russian econ-
omy for years and the economic consequences of tensions in relations with the 
West were exacerbated by a number of factors that were beyond the Russian 
government’s control, primarily, the price of oil in international markets. 
The slump in oil prices in the second half of 2014 by more than 50%, the deep-
est since the 2008-2009 crisis (from US$ 115 in June to US$ 56 in late December), 
turned out to be particularly painful for the Russian economy. The causes of 
the slump included the slowing down of the global economy (largely as a result 
of the weakening dynamics of China’s growth), as well as higher supply of oil 
due to growing production, especially in Libya, the US and Iraq, and the deci-
sion of OPEC to maintain production levels despite the falling prices. 
18 Rosstat figures.
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The dynamics of oil prices directly influences the budget stability of Russia be-
cause revenues from the sale of oil, gas and petroleum products account for 
half of its budget. The budget balance depends on the net effect of the dynam-
ics of currency revenues and the rouble-to-dollar exchange rate. If oil prices 
decrease by 1 dollar, Russia’s budget revenue decreases by around US$ 2 billion, 
but at the same time if the dollar appreciates by 1 rouble, Russia gains RUB 
210 billion in additional budget revenue. Even though this dynamic produced 
a positive outcome in 2014, and Russia closed the year with a budget surplus, 
the government, facing the continuing decline in oil prices, announced spend-
ing cuts of 10% and a budget deficit in 2015.19 The cuts will affect the defence, 
space and aircraft industries, i.e. Russia’s high technology export sectors, as 
well as education.
19 In mid-January, the Ministry of Finance announced a deficit of 2–3% of GDP and around RUB 
3 billion less in budget revenue. The finance minister Anton Siluanov said in late December 
that the depreciation of the rouble offset the drop in oil prices by only 50% in 2014.
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Iv. Impact of tHe crIsIs on russIan busIness
Russia’s worsening economic performance and its political isolation from the 
West are having an impact on the condition of individual sectors of the econo-
my and individual large companies. The depreciation of the rouble is the main 
factor behind the negative developments in this sphere. While it benefits those 
sectors that depend on imports of goods and technologies to a small extent, 
and which reap currency gains from exports, such as the energy, chemical or 
metallurgic industries, it generates losses in the import-dependent branches of 
the economy, which sell mainly in the domestic market (such as the machine 
building industry). The high-technology sectors are the most affected, which 
may solidify Russia’s dysfunctional resource-based economic model. 
Meanwhile, as servicing foreign debt has become more expensive in view of the 
cheapness of the rouble and Western financial sanctions, those companies that 
have little debt or debt denominated in foreign currencies have found themselves 
in a privileged position. One of the most visible consequences of the weakness of 
the rouble has been that the dollar-denominated capitalisation of many compa-
nies and banks has decreased dramatically (see the examples below). The US$-
denominated stock exchange index RTS, which is based on the listings of Rus-
sia’s largest companies from key sectors of the economy, fell by 45% in the course 
of the year, performing worse than any other stock exchange index in the world. 
The real economy, which in Russia has been struggling against a hostile legal 
and institutional environment even while the economic situation remained 
benign, is now experiencing serious problems caused by insufficient supply 
of foreign currency and more difficult access to credit in the domestic market 
(due to the significantly higher CBR base rate) and abroad (because of Russia’s 
deteriorating credit ratings and Western financial sanctions). Rising inflation 
has been driving up most elements of the cost of doing business, and the declin-
ing domestic demand for goods and services has been suppressing revenues. 
The situation of the energy sector, the pillar of the Russian economy, deserves 
particular attention. Even though revenues from the export of energy re-
sources have increased considerably thanks to exchange rate differences, at 
the same time the industry suffered the accumulated negative impact of other 
factors such as the dramatic slump in oil prices, lower volume of gas exports in 
2014 and Western financial sanctions.20 
20 In the short term, the technological sanctions imposed by the West, i.e. the ban on supply-
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In 2014 Gazprom reported the lowest production volume in its history (443–445 
billion m3), as exports decreased in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis and 
due to lower demand in Europe and Russia as a result of warm weather (its 
2014 exports were around 10% lower than in 2013). Gazprom’s financial outlook 
has also been negatively affected by the falling oil prices – because the prices 
in gas contracts are calculated in relation to the price of oil. Over the year, the 
company’s capitalisation decreased by more than 50% (to less than US$ 60 bil-
lion), largely as a result of the depreciation of the rouble. The fact that in late 
December the company suspended the publication of its financial results may 
be an indication of the scale of its problems. 
Other energy giants have also reported significant drops in capitalisation as 
a result of the depreciation of the rouble – the capitalisation of Resent decreased 
by 38% to US$ 50 billion, and LUKoil and Surgutneftegaz were also affected.21 
In connection with the sanctions, Rosneft and Novatek have announced that 
they would postpone the implementation of some of their extraction licences. 
In late December the Russian deputy prime minister Arkady Dvorkovich said 
that Russia could cut its oil production by 5–10% due to low prices and revise its 
investment plans. 
Apart from the immediate difficulties in obtaining the necessary financing to 
service debt, another important problem that the Russian energy companies 
are facing concerns the higher “risk profile” of individual businesses and the 
entire Russian oil and gas sector, which may have an adverse impact on those 
companies’ attractiveness to investors for years to come. On top of this, Rus-
sia’s financial credibility is deteriorating, which affects the way international 
partners view the Russian companies with links to the state.22 
ing Russia with equipment, technologies and services for deep-water and artic drilling and 
shale exploration are of marginal importance. Rather, those sanctions may affect the long-
term development strategy of the Russian energy sector. 
21 The ultimate balance of the gains and losses of energy companies is determined by the net ef-
fect of the decrease in capitalisation and the volume of debt in foreign currency: in the case of 
Novatek, Gazpromneft, Gazprom and Rosneft, i.e. the companies on which the Western sanc-
tions have been imposed, the share of debt in dollars to total debt ranges from 70% to 90%.
22 As an illustration of this mechanism, in December Moody’s cut Gazprom’s foreign currency 
rating from Baa1 to Baa2, and then in January – to Baa3 due to increased risk of a protracted 
recession in Russia and the poor condition of the Russian financial market, as well as the 
risk related to state control of the companies (in January, the ratings of Rosneft, Transneft 
and LUKoil were also cut).
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Other sectors of the Russian economy are also experiencing problems. This 
concerns the aviation industry (over the year, the capitalisation of Aeroflot de-
creased by nearly 80% and several other airlines have applied for state aid), 
the automotive industry (which closed the year with a loss of around 10%) and 
the tourism sector (tour operators are increasingly facing solvency problems, 
mainly as a result of the fall in real wages). Moreover, as the rouble crashed, 
the listings of those Western companies that had major investments in Russia 
declined, which further undermined Russia’s attractiveness to investors.
As the real economy stalls, the conditions in which the banks are operating 
have also deteriorated: this was visible not only in the December bank run 
triggered by the crash of the rouble, but also in the financial results of banks 
for 2014: between January and November the Russian banks together earned 
11.7% less than in the same period in 2013, mainly because they had to increase 
their risk reserves while the activity in the real economy was weakening and 
the demand for credit among individual customers dwindled. 
The capitalisation of banks has decreased (Russia’s largest state-owned bank, 
Sberbank, reported a decline of nearly 70%), as a result of the depreciation of 
the rouble, the falling listings of Russian assets in stock exchanges, and the 
fact that the system has been cut off from foreign capital. In mid-January Fitch 
lowered the long-term ratings of 30 large Russian banks by one notch, cutting 
the ratings of Rosselkhozbank and Gazprombank to speculative grade (BB+).
Oligarchs with links to the Kremlin have also felt the painful consequences of 
the crisis. According to estimates by Bloomberg and Forbes,23 between Febru-
ary and December 2014 the top-twenty richest Russians lost a total of between 
US$ 62 and 73.4 billion. The biggest losers included the Novatek CEO Leonid 
Michelson, Gennady Timchenko and Arkady Rotenberg (members of Putin’s 
inner circle on whom sanctions have been imposed), the owner of the steel-
works holding NLMK, Vladimir Lisin, and Alisher Usmanov, lost up to 50–70% 
of their wealth. The main reasons for the losses concerned lower capitalisa-
tion of their assets as a result of the depreciation of the rouble and, to a lesser 
extent, the tensions in relations with the West, which suppressed their busi-
ness activity through sanctions.24 At the same time, the sanctions offered the 
23 See: Forbes подсчитал потери богатейших россиян в 2014 году, http://top.rbc.ru/economics 
/22/12/2014/5497e6da9a79471285128d65, 22.12. 2014.
24 During the two slumps in the stock exchange alone (on 3 March, after the Federation Coun-
cil authorised the president to use armed forces in Ukraine and on 16 December, during the 
financial crisis) those twenty allegedly lost US$ 10 billion on each occasion.
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business people with links to Vladimir Putin a convenient pretext to demand 
financial aid from the state – Rosneft and Novatek have requested the largest 
amounts of RUB 1.5 trillion and RUB 150 billion, respectively. Since March 2014, 
when the first sanctions against Russia were imposed, companies associated 
with Gennady Timchenko and Arkady Rotenberg, both of whom are on the list 
of sanctioned individuals, have allegedly earned RUB 309 billion from public 
procurement, which is 12% more than their revenue from this source was in 
2013. Similarly, the Rossia bank owned by Yury Kovalchuk, on which sanctions 
have been imposed, allegedly reported profits between January and September 
that exceeded its entire profit in 2013 (Vladimir Putin had personally encour-
aged people to deposit money with the bank).
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v. Impact of tHe crIsIs on tHe people In russIa
In the last months of 2014, ordinary people in Russia started to feel the dete-
riorating economic situation, especially in the form of rising inflation (in the 
agricultural and food sector in particular) and a decrease in real wages. 
As Russia’s financial reserves were shrinking and prices had increased much 
more than the 5.5% that had been expected, the government was not in a posi-
tion to deliver on its pledge to adjust wages. 
Real incomes in November turned out to be 4.7% lower than in November 2013.25 
While unemployment remains low for the time being (slightly above 5%), peo-
ple in Russia are starting to fear for their jobs. 
According to public opinion surveys, around 80% of Russians have already felt 
the impact of the crisis and believe that the situation is worse now than it was 
in the crisis year 2008. More than 20% of the people have had to give up buying 
things which they used to be able to afford.26 
The deteriorating economic situation has not generated any noticeable in-
crease in people’s readiness to protest, which can be explained firstly by the 
fact that the financial situation of people in Russia on average had improved 
considerably over the last decade, secondly – the government’s assurances that 
the level of welfare spending would not be reduced despite the spending cuts, 
and finally, the widespread conviction that what determines the country’s eco-
nomic situation are primarily external factors. 
25 In this, the current crisis differs from the 2009 crisis when people’s real incomes increased 
despite a significant drop in GDP (that crisis was said to have been “drowned” in money, 
thanks to Russia’s huge currency reserves among other factors).
26 On the basis of surveys by the Levada Centre: «Население наконец осознает, что про­
изошло», http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2643585, 30.12.2014.
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vI. russIa In antIcIpatIon of a recessIon. outlook 
for tHe future
The factors that will be of key importance for Russia’s macroeconomic stability 
include the dynamics of oil prices (which are difficult to predict at this stage), 
Russia’s ability to maintain sufficient currency reserves to service its foreign 
debt, and an effective budget policy under the conditions of shrinking resourc-
es. One of the most important objectives will be to keep the banking sector in 
good condition, since the risk of a bank run is currently one of the most im-
portant systemic threats. If Russia’s credit ratings are cut further as a result of 
some serious upheaval in the Russian market (to junk level), that could trigger 
a mass sale of Russian assets and a large scale outflow of capital.27 
The forecasts for the coming years, formulated in late 2014, suggest that at least 
one year of recession is inevitable, with the GDP in 2015 decreasing by any-
where between 3% (according to the Ministry of Economic Development) and 
over 5% (according to the Ministry of Finance), provided that the price of oil 
does not drop below US$ 60 per barrel. However, as the downward trend in oil 
prices continues, the Russian government is preparing for a “black” scenario 
in which the average price of oil will drop to as low as US$ 40 per barrel: the 
Central Bank of Russia and the Ministry of Finance have been working on the 
respective stress tests. According to some experts, under such a scenario Rus-
sia’s GDP could decrease by as much as 9%.28 
Importantly, the recession will coincide with inflation, and the latter will 
deepen the former (the Ministry of Finance expects two-digit inflation), and 
further depreciation of the rouble also cannot be ruled out. Russia could only 
remain relatively stable if the forecasts that predict an increase of the oil price 
to US$ 70-80 per barrel in 2015 turn out to be accurate.
One should expect the standards of living to deteriorate for a prolonged pe-
riod, largely due to the fact that the state’s financial reserves have shrunk con-
siderably, which means that the cycle of pay rises in the state-owned sector 
27 The minister for economic development Alexei Ulyukayev announced in late December 
that the government was preparing for such a scenario, e.g. it was discussing a mechanism 
for buying corporate bonds with funds from the state treasury. However, the shrinking fi-
nancial reserves of the state may pose a problem.
28 В России готовят стресс­сценарий для нефти в 40 долларов за баррель на 2015 год, http://
www.profi-forex.org/novosti-rossii/entry1008239665.html, 25.12.2014. 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
22
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
2/
20
15
will come to an end, wages in the public sector will be adjusted at a slower rate 
or not at all, and unemployment may increase by around 2 percentage points. 
While this is not much at the level of the entire country (the rise in unemploy-
ment may be offset by an expansion of the grey economy), serious problems at 
the local level are likely to occur, especially in the depressed regions and the 
“monocities” that depend on a single sector or a single large industrial plant. 
According to the predictions of the former finance minister, Alexei Kudrin, with 
the oil price at US$ 40 per barrel, real incomes of people may decrease by around 
10% in the years 2015–2017. Combined with the erosion of revenues in the real 
economy, this will lead to a shrinking of the tax base and budget revenue. 
The consequences of the Russian counter-sanctions in the food sector, which 
will become even more severe in 2015, will be the hardest factor for ordinary 
people in Russia. Food prices may increase by up to 20% (and Russians already 
spend around 40% of their incomes on food). It is also likely that a shortage of 
other consumer goods will deepen due to the steep price of imports and limited 
options for import substitution. 
The calendar term of foreign debt repayments and Russia’s ability to raise 
capital for this purpose will be important for the country’s financial stability 
over the next two years. In 2015, even if the sanctions remain in place, Russia 
should be able to manage to service its foreign debt with its currency reserves 
at the present level.29 However, individual companies may face serious diffi-
culties in this regard.30 While the debt of the public administration bodies is 
small (slightly over US$ 57 billion, including only US$ 3.2 billion with maturity 
dates within one year), the banking sector’s debt is nearly US$ 209 billion, of 
which around US$ 51 billion will have to be repaid within a year, and the total 
debt of the remaining sectors is US$ 449 billion, including US$ 105 billion with 
due dates in one year or less. Large debt repayments are already scheduled in 
February-March 2015.31 The situation varies among different companies in the 
29 The Central Bank of Russia, the Reserve Fund and the National Welfare Fund together hold 
around US$ 450 billion, compared to total foreign debt of less than US$ 680 billion as of the 
beginning of December 2014.
30 According to Moody’s, only 7% of the companies it monitors may experience problems with 
servicing their debt by the end of 2015 and need refinancing. Debt repayment problems may 
worsen only in the longer term and then state aid will be necessary. Moody’s проанализировал 
долги российских компаний, http://top.rbc.ru/finances/22/10/2014/5447c31acbb20f7d2ab76
84e, 22.10.2014.
31 See the Central Bank of Russia figures at www.cbr.ru. 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
23
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
2/
20
15
real and financial sectors. The sanctioned state-owned banks (Vneshtorgbank, 
Sberbank, Gazprombank) will have to repay large amounts on their Eurobonds 
in 2015, and in the real economy, Rosneft will have to repay as much as US$ 
19.5 billion, more than any other company.32 
Beyond 2015, unless the sanctions are lifted, Russian analysts believe that most 
companies will face financing deficits that will push them to seek assistance 
from the state, but it is unclear to what extent the sate will be able to offer such 
assistance under the conditions of a deepening recession. 
The big companies that enjoy the patronage of the Kremlin will emerge victori-
ous from the struggle over increasingly scarce resources, while the cost will be 
shouldered by those oligarchs with looser links to the decision-making centre 
(this trend is already evident in the decision, taken in December, to renational-
ise Bashneft, most likely in the interest of Rosneft), and even more importantly, 
the small and medium-sized enterprises, the cornerstone of Russia’s long-term 
development, which will have to pay for saving the large state-owned and pri-
vate companies while at the same time facing difficulties in securing access to 
credit (the Russian banks will likely prefer to save the giants with links to the 
state first, including the exporting companies who report revenues in foreign 
currency). 
The likely lowering of Russia’s credit rating, combined with the need to bor-
row more or reduce the “financial cushion” by eroding the state’s reserves, will 
drive up the cost of stabilising Russia’s economic system. The Russian economy 
should forget about development for the next couple of years – a survival strat-
egy will be a priority. 
osw team
The text was completed by the end of January 2015
32 In February and March, Vneshtorgbank will have to repay EUR 1 billion and more than US$ 1 bil-
lion, Sberbank will have to repay US$ 1.5 billion and more than CHF 400 billion in the second half 
of the year (Gazprombank will also have to raise similar amounts). Gazprom will have to pay 
a total of EUR 1.85 billion and US$ 1.7 billion in the course of the year. Правительство 
не исключило выкупа корпоративных облигаций при снижении рейтинга России до «мусо­
рного», http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/37917841/pravitelstvo-ne-isklyuchilo -vykupa 
-korporativnyh-obligacij?utm _ source=vedomosti& utm _medium=widget& utm _
campaign=vedomosti&utm_content=link, 26.12.2014; Прогноз: «Роснефти» предстоит 
самый трудный год, http://www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/37879871/trudnyj-god-
rosnefti, 26.12.2014.
